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<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title>Onion Flash · Relays</title><link>https://1aeo.com/onionflash/</link><description>Important Tor news, distilled.</description><language>en</language><atom:link xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" href="https://1aeo.com/onionflash/tags/relay.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><lastBuildDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 05:50:14 GMT</lastBuildDate><item><title>Community analysis details HSDir flood patterns affecting ~300 Tor relays</title><link>https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/724ee8a77e50d745adbc6863/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/724ee8a77e50d745adbc6863/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 05:50:14 GMT</pubDate><category>network</category><category>dos</category><category>relay</category><category>security</category><description>&lt;p&gt;A community report on the tor-relays mailing list presents custom metrics from approximately 300 relays, identifying 30 distinct flood windows over 48 hours. The data indicates that descriptor fetching and HTTP-wait closures dominated the traffic, with one relay recording over 14 million fetches. The report notes that Tor 0.4.9.15 is expected to rate limit some of these requests, while a separate incident report describes a relay experiencing memory exhaustion and OOM termination during a similar period.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; The detailed metrics provide specific evidence of the traffic composition during recent network-wide resource exhaustion events, helping to distinguish between different types of flood attacks and validate the effectiveness of upcoming rate-limiting measures.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reported · High priority · Developing&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol class="source-list"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-relays@lists.torproject.org/message/52RMDSPN5JC6JYH2ERGLEIBO6JUD6MT7/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;[tor-relays] Re: Shutting down my ~40 guards&lt;/a&gt; &lt;span class="source-domain"&gt;lists.torproject.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;</description></item><item><title>Reported sustained circuit-building DoS wave on Tor network since June 2026</title><link>https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/0f81e7178416ff7f4ddf11bf/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/0f81e7178416ff7f4ddf11bf/</guid><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 15:19:45 GMT</pubDate><category>security</category><category>dos</category><category>network</category><category>relay</category><description>&lt;p&gt;A relay operator reports a sustained circuit-building DoS against their guard relay family starting June 25, 2026, characterized by an 8x sustained increase in open circuits and a 20x peak. The attack involved millions of near-idle circuits and onionskin processing spikes across multiple regions, with bandwidth increasing only 20%. While DoS defenses engaged and prevented TCP port exhaustion, EU relays shed 10-20% of real traffic due to capacity constraints.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; The report suggests the pattern is network-wide or family-targeted, and notes that EU relays shed 10-20% of real traffic.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Reported · High priority · Developing&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol class="source-list"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/113" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Circuit-building DoS wave since 2026-06-25: 20x peak, 8x sustained open circuits on guard relays&lt;/a&gt; &lt;span class="source-domain"&gt;gitlab.torproject.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>