{"version": "https://jsonfeed.org/version/1.1", "title": "Onion Flash", "home_page_url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/", "feed_url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/feed.json", "description": "Important Tor news, distilled.", "language": "en", "items": [{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/293e1780b570c80dd6b205f6/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/293e1780b570c80dd6b205f6/", "title": "Tor 0.4.9.15 security release adds DoS defenses and drops 0.4.8 support", "content_text": "The Tor Project released version 0.4.9.15, a security update introducing new defenses against large volumes of directory requests. The release makes the HSDir flag sticky across restarts and updates directory authorities to require specific protocol capabilities, rendering Tor versions 0.4.8 and earlier incompatible with the network. Operators are advised to upgrade relays as soon as possible.\n\nWhy it matters: The release includes critical DoS mitigations for relays and enforces protocol changes that will disconnect older clients from the network.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/tags/tor-0.4.9.15\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/metrics/timeline/-/blob/70f336c3c0af306b4aaab13b32f77b062c538ec6/README.md?plain=1#L80\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-announce@lists.torproject.org/message/WXHTSV43NO5UZQ7Q634S5NS5MIRL5JSJ/", "date_published": "2026-10-28T18:31:01Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-10T17:12:47Z", "tags": ["release", "directory-authority", "dos", "protocol", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/20df99576e2f96d67dbd532c/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/20df99576e2f96d67dbd532c/", "title": "Tor authority maatuska reports significantly fewer Guard flags than consensus", "content_text": "Following a power outage on 2025-10-27, the Tor directory authority maatuska has been reporting substantially fewer relays with Guard flags in its votes compared to the network consensus. While initial reports showed a discrepancy of over 3,000 flags, recent data from November 2026 indicates the gap persists, with maatuska voting for roughly half the Guard relays of other authorities. The issue remains open.\n\nWhy it matters: Scope and consequences remain subject to the linked upstream discussion.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/106\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/106#note_3490239", "date_published": "2025-10-31T13:54:12Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-10T15:49:54Z", "tags": ["network", "directory-authority", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/e9f08f3ebc1cc1253f610f31/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/e9f08f3ebc1cc1253f610f31/", "title": "Tor authority bastet to be removed from source after reported compromise", "content_text": "Correct · 2026-11-10T13:57:38Z: Corrected an unsupported claim that ordinary relay operators must edit their configurations. The cited issues request removal of bastet's existing entry from the software.\n\nThe Tor development team reported that the operator of the bastet directory authority notified them that the machine is very plausibly compromised. The report states that bastet will be removed from the source code because its keys can no longer be trusted. The operator is expected to generate a new identity for the authority.\n\nWhy it matters: The report says bastet's existing keys can no longer be trusted and requests removal of its current entry from the software.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2847\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41473", "date_published": "2026-11-06T17:59:18Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-10T13:57:38Z", "tags": ["security", "directory-authority", "network"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/38d1ed5ee8761fb5dd1acaac/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/38d1ed5ee8761fb5dd1acaac/", "title": "Tor Browser 16.0.1 released for all platforms", "content_text": "The Tor Project has published Tor Browser 16.0.1 for Android, Windows, macOS, and Linux. This update includes a rebase onto Firefox 153.7.0esr, an update to Tor 0.4.9.16, and backported security fixes from Firefox 160.\n\nWhy it matters: The release incorporates backported security fixes and updates to the underlying Tor and Firefox components.\n\nSources:\nhttps://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-1601/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-announce@lists.torproject.org/message/AFBPF343F7JILEKJ5PM2IJBM5OJSYWPO/", "date_published": "2026-11-10T00:00:00Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-10T09:20:45Z", "tags": ["release", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/2b8a829099f2d5f0862c6ced/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/2b8a829099f2d5f0862c6ced/", "title": "Consensus-health notifications report repeated warnings for bastet", "content_text": "Across 20 notifications dated 2026-11-08T09:13:49Z through 2026-11-10T07:13:46Z, Tor Project Consensus Health Monitoring Mailing List reported a missing authority in a consensus; a missing authority descriptor; a missing authority signature for bastet. These are reports from a monitoring feed; the notifications do not establish a continuous outage, its cause, or its operational impact.\n\nWhy it matters: The repeated document checks provide a source-linked monitoring observation for further investigation; the cause and wider impact remain unestablished.\n\nSources:\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/BMX6CVDGNKXFSNSQF3NZFNSIOEFIUMCA/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/FLUQUWLOPKESCSJGLQZUY6EZNGE76IXY/", "date_published": "2026-11-08T09:13:49Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-10T07:13:46Z", "tags": ["directory-authority", "network"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/d5a6f8f1eb19422def178b92/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/d5a6f8f1eb19422def178b92/", "title": "Consensus-health notifications report repeated warnings for maatuska", "content_text": "Across 16 notifications dated 2026-11-08T10:09:18Z through 2026-11-10T04:07:22Z, Tor Project Consensus Health Monitoring Mailing List reported a missing authority in a consensus; a Guard-flag discrepancy for maatuska. These are reports from a monitoring feed; the notifications do not establish a continuous outage, its cause, or its operational impact.\n\nWhy it matters: The repeated document checks provide a source-linked monitoring observation for further investigation; the cause and wider impact remain unestablished.\n\nSources:\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/5L3XFEQFXZUCTRNV5HKWKEY2Y6Z632KF/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/AD3MC7CIRIUTEQ6I5WZU7DKZOT34ZMXJ/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/P7LNLU2WQNX2IA3PMID7EATE4HPVKPK7/", "date_published": "2026-11-08T10:09:18Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-10T04:07:22Z", "tags": ["directory-authority", "network"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/62d3ac41be0ed05572e83eee/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/62d3ac41be0ed05572e83eee/", "title": "Arti reported to have proof-of-work queue bypass allowing zero-effort eviction", "content_text": "A security report filed via HackerOne and published on GitLab describes a defect in Arti's rendezvous queue where a client sending no proof-of-work can evict a queued client that did. The report states this defeats the priority queue's purpose but notes it does not demonstrate a sustained denial of service. A maintainer commented that the issue is a bug but does not seem like a DoS issue, and a fix issue was created.\n\nWhy it matters: The report states that the defect defeats the purpose of the priority queue, allowing clients to bypass proof-of-work requirements for queue admission.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2746\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2746#note_3489309\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2746#note_3489319", "date_published": "2026-09-22T20:45:02Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-09T15:23:01Z", "tags": ["security", "dos", "protocol"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/e0c18475912e02694d82b37f/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/e0c18475912e02694d82b37f/", "title": "Consensus-health notifications report repeated warnings for moria1", "content_text": "Across 2 notifications dated 2026-11-09T14:07:20Z through 2026-11-09T15:07:27Z, Tor Project Consensus Health Monitoring Mailing List reported a missing authority descriptor for moria1. These are reports from a monitoring feed; the notifications do not establish a continuous outage, its cause, or its operational impact.\n\nWhy it matters: The repeated document checks provide a source-linked monitoring observation for further investigation; the cause and wider impact remain unestablished.\n\nSources:\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/7SHXEU3DFZZVEV3DJINGZ7ATU6P63UFF/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/DIUXDCHXL52CYD6Z4JZANBU7KAT3WBRC/", "date_published": "2026-11-09T14:07:20Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-09T15:07:27Z", "tags": ["directory-authority", "network"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/53f8b00d45ecd0410b475e73/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/53f8b00d45ecd0410b475e73/", "title": "Consensus-health notifications report repeated warnings for dizum", "content_text": "Across 3 notifications dated 2026-11-08T22:07:20Z through 2026-11-09T02:07:20Z, Tor Project Consensus Health Monitoring Mailing List reported a missing authority signature; an outdated consensus document for dizum. These are reports from a monitoring feed; the notifications do not establish a continuous outage, its cause, or its operational impact.\n\nWhy it matters: The repeated document checks provide a source-linked monitoring observation for further investigation; the cause and wider impact remain unestablished.\n\nSources:\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/DFV6HRHORCOUV6MK5OKL7BBNWRRH35HL/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/X7RAKOWSWQKTZUCX5I6ZIOECOXOG4CES/\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-consensus-health@lists.torproject.org/message/3BD4YQKUUNRBZD5TLNYGOTSLLIPQIRH2/", "date_published": "2026-11-08T22:07:20Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-09T02:07:20Z", "tags": ["directory-authority", "network"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/8d826e921925b2b794711a94/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/8d826e921925b2b794711a94/", "title": "Tor 0.4.9.16 released to address dirauth overload on maatuska", "content_text": "Following a period of packet drops and consensus delays affecting the maatuska directory authority, Tor 0.4.9.16 was released. The release introduced consensus-method 38, which reportedly eased pressure on directory authorities and reduced traffic from maatuska. Upstream network issues that contributed to the overload were also addressed during this period.\n\nWhy it matters: The release of consensus-method 38 is intended to ease pressure on directory authorities.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/117\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/117#note_3486704\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/117#note_3486710", "date_published": "2026-11-03T15:25:38Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-05T09:06:00Z", "tags": ["release", "directory-authority", "network"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/bcc0c2f0eea5063a2c090ca6/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/bcc0c2f0eea5063a2c090ca6/", "title": "Tor issue reports v3 onion client-auth private key exposure in logs", "content_text": "A security report filed against Tor core identifies a vulnerability where a malformed `.auth_private` file causes Tor to log a near-complete v3 onion-service client-auth private key at WARN level, even when `SafeLogging` is enabled. The report states the issue affects Tor 0.3.5.1-alpha through 0.4.9.11 and the current main branch, with no fixed release identified. Public comments from Tor developers suggest a fix using safe logging.\n\nWhy it matters: The report indicates that a lower-trust principal with access to Tor logs could obtain a near-complete private key from a malformed credential file, potentially compromising client authorization for v3 onion services.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41321\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41321#note_3453337", "date_published": "2026-08-13T17:56:41Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-04T20:07:38Z", "tags": ["security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/e62ee76ef550d41d11507dc0/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/e62ee76ef550d41d11507dc0/", "title": "Tor releases 0.4.9.16 emergency fix for directory authority thundering herd", "content_text": "The Tor Project released version 0.4.9.16 as an emergency update specifically for directory authorities. The release addresses a 'thundering herd' issue caused by new required protover values in the previous release, which was causing older clients to exit. It also includes a workaround for a bug where old clients failed to handle unparseable microdescriptors correctly when TAP keys were omitted.\n\nWhy it matters: Scope and consequences remain subject to the linked upstream discussion.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/tags/tor-0.4.9.16\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-announce@lists.torproject.org/message/ERTTFP7CBZDGGEPBFZBVIGQR5LAMNXWM/", "date_published": "2026-11-04T19:53:47Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-04T19:53:47Z", "tags": ["release", "directory-authority", "protocol", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/bdbc2f5f88b95bedcac3be45/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/bdbc2f5f88b95bedcac3be45/", "title": "Arti 2.8.0 release checklist", "content_text": "The Arti project has an open issue titled 'Arti 2.8.0 release' which serves as an automatically scraped release checklist. The checklist includes steps for preparing confidential security patches, finalizing the changelog, and performing the release, with most items marked as complete. Post-release tasks are also listed, with some items remaining unchecked.\n\nWhy it matters: Scope and consequences remain subject to the linked upstream discussion.\n\nSources:\nhttps://blog.torproject.org/arti_2_8_0_released/\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/tags/arti-v2.8.0\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2843", "date_published": "2026-11-03T00:00:00Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-04T17:59:36Z", "tags": ["release", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/20d4c07cc947b330283ddbf4/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/20d4c07cc947b330283ddbf4/", "title": "Tor developers revert protocol capability change to unstick clients in restart loop", "content_text": "Tor developers merged a revert of a recent change that listed multiple protocol capabilities as required. The revert addresses issues causing clients on version 0.4.8.x or lower to get stuck in a restart loop while fetching unusable consensus. This action allows affected clients to rejoin the network and treat microdescriptions as valid.\n\nWhy it matters: The revert is intended to resolve a network-wide incident where a significant number of clients were unable to connect due to consensus fetching failures.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/merge_requests/1074", "date_published": "2026-11-03T14:30:32Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-03T14:30:32Z", "tags": ["network", "protocol", "release"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/ceaffc78b1d2c4992015a9b5/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/ceaffc78b1d2c4992015a9b5/", "title": "Tor SOCKS5 CRLF injection vulnerability reported", "content_text": "A security report describes a CRLF injection vulnerability in the Tor daemon's SOCKS5 server, allowing an unauthenticated client to inject fake control event lines into the controller stream. The issue requires the non-default `AllowNonRFC953Hostnames=1` setting and was reported via HackerOne. A developer comment notes that a basic fix is available in a merge request targeted at the main branch, and the issue is currently closed.\n\nWhy it matters: Controllers parsing events line-by-line may become desynchronized and act on forged state transitions if the non-default hostname setting is enabled.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41283\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41283#note_3424949", "date_published": "2026-05-27T08:16:14Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-02T22:29:25Z", "tags": ["security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/705f9cd6c7dd0c913c8b3ceb/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/705f9cd6c7dd0c913c8b3ceb/", "title": "Reported uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Arti onion services", "content_text": "A security report filed via HackerOne describes a vulnerability in Arti's onion-service implementation where invalid proof-of-work requests cause unbounded growth of persistent replay logs. The report states that an unauthenticated attacker can append approximately 16 bytes of data per request without solving the proof of work, potentially leading to filesystem exhaustion and service unavailability. The issue remains open in the Arti development tracker.\n\nWhy it matters: The report indicates that this vulnerability could allow an attacker to cause a denial of service against onion services by exhausting disk space, requiring operator intervention for recovery.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2792", "date_published": "2026-10-01T20:54:21Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-02T16:45:52Z", "tags": ["security", "dos", "release"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/270bfa4379c9f365f7b59df9/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/270bfa4379c9f365f7b59df9/", "title": "Arti release checklist completed for October 1, 2026", "content_text": "The Arti development team has completed the release checklist for the October 1, 2026 release. The process included merging confidential security patches from a private branch into the main branch, finalizing the changelog, and publishing the crates. A signed git tag was created to mark the release.\n\nWhy it matters: This release includes confidential security patches that were merged into the main branch, indicating updates to the Arti software infrastructure.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/2761", "date_published": "2026-09-28T15:16:17Z", "date_modified": "2026-11-02T15:35:52Z", "tags": ["release", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/026dba6fbbccde7173215ad0/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/026dba6fbbccde7173215ad0/", "title": "Tor security report identifies format string bug in consensus generation", "content_text": "A security report identified an incorrect format string in Tor's consensus generation that the report says allowed three colluding directory authorities to prevent consensus publication. The project labeled the severity as low because exploitation requires control of multiple authorities. A comment by @arma states the issue is listed as fixed in 0.4.9.15 as of commit 407ccd28a.\n\nWhy it matters: The report states that three colluding directory authorities can wedge consensus on all honest authorities, resulting in a network-wide DoS.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41456\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41456#note_3479487\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41456#note_3483410", "date_published": "2026-10-20T16:53:40Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-30T14:45:31Z", "tags": ["security", "dos", "release"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/5a81ce692e24f4833c818e83/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/5a81ce692e24f4833c818e83/", "title": "Tails 7.16 released with Tor Browser 16.0 and Tor 0.4.9.15", "content_text": "The Tails project has released version 7.16, which updates the bundled Tor Browser to 16.0 and the Tor client to 0.4.9.15. The release also includes a fix for OpenPGP support in Thunderbird. Users can upgrade their Tails USB sticks automatically from version 7.0 or later.\n\nWhy it matters: This release provides updated security components and bug fixes for users relying on the Tails operating system for privacy.\n\nSources:\nhttps://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_16/", "date_published": "2026-10-30T00:00:00Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-30T00:00:00Z", "tags": ["release", "feature", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/fb723adafa0fc4cf7cc0c46d/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/fb723adafa0fc4cf7cc0c46d/", "title": "Tor Browser 16.0 released for all platforms", "content_text": "The Tor Project has published Tor Browser 16.0 for Android, Windows, macOS, and Linux. The release updates the underlying Tor version to 0.4.9.15 and Firefox to 153.6.0esr, alongside various security and privacy adjustments such as disabling WebGPU and XSLT.\n\nWhy it matters: Users should update to the latest version to receive the updated Tor and Firefox components and associated security fixes.\n\nSources:\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-announce@lists.torproject.org/message/ULNTF635JG6AGS7TARW55GGJIRSNMS5K/", "date_published": "2026-10-29T16:58:14Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-29T16:58:14Z", "tags": ["release", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/0a9ab058f39bcb73a51a3424/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/0a9ab058f39bcb73a51a3424/", "title": "Tor 0.4.9.15 fixes bug where clients permanently shun exits after transient errors", "content_text": "A bug in Tor's nodelist handling caused clients to permanently mark an exit relay as rejecting all traffic after receiving a single transient RELAY_END message, such as RESOURCELIMIT or HIBERNATING. This issue, introduced in Tor 0.2.3.1-alpha, allowed a third party to steer clients away from honest exits by exhausting an exit's sockets or sending a malicious END. The fix, which clears the 'rejects_all' flag when a new consensus is installed, is slated for the next stable release.\n\nWhy it matters: This fix prevents a remote attacker from manipulating a client's usable exit set, which could otherwise lead to targeted denial of service or privacy leaks by biasing circuit selection.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41450\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41450#note_3480451\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/work_items/41450#note_3482897", "date_published": "2026-10-10T12:31:53Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-29T15:01:33Z", "tags": ["security", "network", "release"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/724ee8a77e50d745adbc6863/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/724ee8a77e50d745adbc6863/", "title": "Community analysis details HSDir flood patterns affecting ~300 Tor relays", "content_text": "A community report on the tor-relays mailing list presents custom metrics from approximately 300 relays, identifying 30 distinct flood windows over 48 hours. The data indicates that descriptor fetching and HTTP-wait closures dominated the traffic, with one relay recording over 14 million fetches. The report notes that Tor 0.4.9.15 is expected to rate limit some of these requests, while a separate incident report describes a relay experiencing memory exhaustion and OOM termination during a similar period.\n\nWhy it matters: The detailed metrics provide specific evidence of the traffic composition during recent network-wide resource exhaustion events, helping to distinguish between different types of flood attacks and validate the effectiveness of upcoming rate-limiting measures.\n\nSources:\nhttps://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-relays@lists.torproject.org/message/52RMDSPN5JC6JYH2ERGLEIBO6JUD6MT7/", "date_published": "2026-10-29T05:50:14Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-29T05:50:14Z", "tags": ["network", "dos", "relay", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/4bfda1c276b4fd59b4d9a3cd/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/4bfda1c276b4fd59b4d9a3cd/", "title": "Tor Browser 16.0 released with Firefox ESR 153 and new privacy features", "content_text": "The Tor Project has released Tor Browser 16.0 for Desktop and Android, marking the first stable release based on Firefox ESR 153. This update includes a redesigned Settings interface, an option for generic window titles to prevent local snooping, and native support for 64-bit ARM Linux. The release also incorporates over 270 Bugzilla fixes from the annual ESR transition audit to address potential privacy and security impacts.\n\nWhy it matters: This release updates the browser's core engine and introduces new privacy protections, such as generic window titles, while expanding platform support to 64-bit ARM Linux devices.\n\nSources:\nhttps://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-160/", "date_published": "2026-10-29T00:00:00Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-29T00:00:00Z", "tags": ["release", "feature", "security"]},
{"id": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/0f81e7178416ff7f4ddf11bf/", "url": "https://1aeo.com/onionflash/news/0f81e7178416ff7f4ddf11bf/", "title": "Reported sustained circuit-building DoS wave on Tor network since June 2026", "content_text": "A relay operator reports a sustained circuit-building DoS against their guard relay family starting June 25, 2026, characterized by an 8x sustained increase in open circuits and a 20x peak. The attack involved millions of near-idle circuits and onionskin processing spikes across multiple regions, with bandwidth increasing only 20%. While DoS defenses engaged and prevented TCP port exhaustion, EU relays shed 10-20% of real traffic due to capacity constraints.\n\nWhy it matters: The report suggests the pattern is network-wide or family-targeted, and notes that EU relays shed 10-20% of real traffic.\n\nSources:\nhttps://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/analysis/-/work_items/113", "date_published": "2026-07-13T15:19:45Z", "date_modified": "2026-10-27T13:45:06Z", "tags": ["security", "dos", "network", "relay"]}]}